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Abstract 
Information security and privacy regulation are significant areas of legislation in the 
financial and micro-finance sectors in the world.  There are significant disparities between the 
developed and developing countries concerning adoption and application of the data protection 
laws. The developed world has exemplified its laws in the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) clause of the European Union that comes into effect on May 18, 2018. In the US, the 
main law has been the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of the late 1990s.  The developing 
countries, on the other hand, exhibit slow drafting of new finance and micro-finance privacy 
laws and still use policies of the 1990s. The purpose of the study is, therefore, to examine the 
effectiveness of privacy and data protection laws in finance and micro-finance sectors in the 
developed and developing parts of the world in the current technological era. The method of the 
study is a mixed qualitative and quantitative assessment of case studies of recent literature on the 
subject. Each case study will feature the variables of the presence of privacy laws and 
information security regulations, and the level of enforcement of those regulations that inform 
the statistics. The other variable will be the level of effectiveness of the application of privacy 
and information security laws in developed and developing nations based on case study 
outcomes. The results indicate that out of 10 examined cases, six show failures of the laws in 
developing nations while 1 shows failure in a developed nation (South Korea) and 1, in the US, 
presents mixed results. The recommendations include the adoption of international laws that 
govern data security in the financial sector, such as the current GDPR of the European of Union. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Introduction 
The rise in data breaches all over the world makes the prioritization of privacy and 
information security key amongst various successful enterprises.  The interconnected global 
economy has made it possible to share data across different jurisdictions and create new digital 
identities (Blum, 2017). For this reason, there is a need for data security laws to fill the 
vulnerabilities that this interconnected system presents. One of these is the need to propagate 
new access restriction systems that can reduce breaches of identity theft (Blum, 2017). However, 
with the stipulated technological flow of information and data, various other aspects of 
information security and privacy are under crossfire. For instance, the development of consumer 
relationship technology, intense competition and the need for personalized products has made 
banking institutions to tap into consumer data (Omarini, 2011). With various developed 
economies, the above issue will often be considered as a violation of the consumer privacy 
rights, while in developing countries, the limited regulatory framework does not consider such 
issues to be impacting or else, critical when facilitating the protection of their citizens. Making a 
comparison between the data and privacy regulations implemented by most developed states like 
EU and U.S, Cano (2014) insists that developing countries can limit the occurrence of fraudulent 
activities in their economies by adopting some of the security measures implemented by 
regulators like SEC. Laying implicit emphasis on the various supervision and regulatory policies 
integrated by Microfinance Institutions (MFIs), the research critiques the expected outcomes that 
the various privacy and data protection policies would have upon developing nations/economies. 
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The policies used by developed nations, in essence, bring about the improvement of 
quality services in the financial sector. This is because information security regulation at the 
private level has involved over 30 years of continuous research in many sectors, including 
finance, to assess software weaknesses against threats (Schmidt & White, 2017). This has made 
data protection strong in the United States. However, Schmidt and White (2017), note that 
despite this proactive approach, major cyber incidents still occur, with a case in point being the 
Equifax breach of 2017. Analysts touted that the compromise occurred from the use of security 
programs that were not up-to-date unlike those of the hackers (Schmidt & White, 2017). The 
outcome brings into question the ability of enterprises to maintain in-house technological 
maintenance (Schmidt & White, 2017). Data security as such deals with the existing enterprise's 
ability to determine the manner in which data in a computer system could be subject to sharing 
with other third parties. 
 According to Agelidis (2016), under the GLBA law of 1999, information security for 
financial companies entails the practices that entities enforce to safeguard personal data against 
external access.  It is also an expectation for the companies to offer written evidence to their 
clients on how they intend to ensure the latter's privacy (Agelidis, 2016). The loss of information 
and data often occur as a result of unauthorized access, examination, use, modification, 
disclosure, copying, or moving data/information without customer consent. For instance, the 
digital disclosure of hacked information publicly has become common due to the mass access to 
the Internet as a platform for corporate information (Agelidis, 2016).   
To enable effective protection levels, the U.S Securities and other industrial policing 
facilitate the realization of proper regulatory standards, which will essentially mandate the 
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creation of information security practices at an organizational or national level. The SEC, for 
example, provides a risk assessment document each year that companies fill to review the threat 
background in the context of financial losses and customer data breaches (Khan, 2016). Drawing 
from the above issue, one might conclusively concur that realizing the protection of consumer 
details, information, and data (mainly, concerning financial statements) requires nations, 
enterprises, and global corporations (such as WTO, World Bank) to develop security or privacy 
networks/technologies. 
Technology in developing countries, on the other hand, has attracted many small 
organizations in finance and micro-finance, among other industries (Dahiru & Allison, 2014). 
Evidence shows that most of the African small-scale enterprises and micro-finance are not as 
adept as their Western counterparts in the countering of information security and privacy 
challenges (Dahiru & Allison, 2014). Many first-time ventures into the digital environment often 
incur cybercrime-related losses (Dahiru & Allison, 2014). 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2016), argues that although 
African states have evolved regional data protection mechanisms, these are still enshrined in 
trading pacts. As a result, the eventual outcome of such regional models is uncertain in the 
current epoch where many countries lack technological resources to keep up with advanced 
cybercrime (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2016). In Asian countries, 
there is a growing need to adopt data protection frameworks that go beyond the 1990s, when 
most of these countries promulgated most of their privacy laws (Yu, 2017). Indeed, most of the 
implemented regulations have to integrate protections that align with technology and innovative 
paradigms.   
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The various industries in developing countries often experience the emerging or else, 
impacting aspects that correlate to data security and regulations. In this sense, most of the 
developing world’s industries could be said to be inconsiderate of the fact that some industries 
and business’ operational efficiency, essentially calls for significant transformations in sectors 
such as banking tech. Additionally, the use of Information Technology in various sectors 
including telecommunication has fawned certain requirement for data protection in banks and 
other industries (Singh, Picot, Kranz, Gupta, & Ojha, 2013). In such an occurrence or shifts in 
regulations to compel improvement of operational, enterprise, banking and micro-finance’ 
regulatory standards, as well as, the mitigation of data breaches that are quite prevalent under 
most financial foundations in developing nations, company or governmental agencies, and other 
interested lobby groups such as WTO (world trade organization) should always involve usage of 
policing framework and data protection strategies. 
Corporate information security interventions and the reporting of data breaches are some 
of the recommended ways to reduce financial losses and privacy compromises (Laube & Bohme, 
2016). Various nations require that companies regularly report all ensuing cyber-attacks (Laube 
& Bohme, 2016). One corporate intervention is the use of trained employees to run the 
information security department of a company or to outsource it (Patel, 2008). Either way, 
studies from outsourcing in India have revealed that both internal and external data protection 
rules are difficult to follow as they are continually changing (Patel, 2008). One report indicates 
that one in every five Western companies with either the internal or external data protection 
model does not comply with data breach reporting requirements due to the ever-changing 
statuses of the laws (Patel, 2008). A company’s regulations, in essence, can facilitate the 
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increment in efficiency specifically during the identification of unauthorized and external file 
access. However, unlike most companies operating in developed nations, the possibility of data 
breaches as well as privacy violations in various developing or further, undeveloped states will 
always be high corresponding to the challenging conditions experienced at the economic 
markets/levels. 
There is also a low commitment to keep up with new technology in developing countries 
especially in micro-finance, such as in Asia (Yu, 2017). Despite having a growth rate of ten times 
in Internet access since the early 2000s, China and other countries of Asia are now coping with 
outdated laws of previous decades (Broadhurst & Chang, 2013; Yu, 2017). The inability by 
microfinance institutions to implement usage of better protection mechanisms especially at 
financial and organizational levels will inevitably bring about the increase in vulnerability to data 
breaches as well as loss of revenue. 
With the rise of mobile and Information and Communications Technology (ICT) 
framework in developing nations, businesses are not just exposed to traditional market 
competition but electronic data security (Klimburg & Zylberberg, 2015). This security necessity 
sometimes comes with a price tag in that it costs banking institutions vital customer data 
(Klimburg & Zylberberg, 2015). For instance, cyber-attacks, generally at the financial level, have 
fleeced South Africa five hundred and seventy-three million dollars (Klimburg & Zylberberg, 
2015). This is mostly due to lack of a proper data regulatory law. As such, enterprises will only 
assure data and privacy regulations, if the protection mechanisms used on employees’ records, 
loyalty schemes, customer details/preferences, and finally, data transactions are characteristic of 
the effective regulatory framework. 
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Various developing countries like India and South Africa have undertaken policy 
measures to regulate breaches on financial data against such acts as identity theft and phishing 
(Cassim, 2015). This is due to the realization that financial companies in both Western and 
developing nations cannot do without technology which they use to store sensitive data on 
computer systems (Klimberg & Zilberberg, 2015). In the United Kingdom and the United States, 
there has been a drive to limit the susceptibility of firms to hacking acts through strong 
regulation (Cassim, 2015). In the US, the first major such act was the 1978 'Right to Financial 
Privacy Act' (Cassim, 2015). In the UK, the 'Fraud Prevention Service' (Cassim, 2015) is the law 
that covers online and financial crimes. In developing nations, like South Africa, there have been 
few anti-identity theft laws which have led to the mushrooming misuse of credit card data 
(Cassim, 2015). 
The occurrence of phishing, hacking, and therefore, the loss of company, database, and 
institutional private data could at times be attributable to elements regarding the professionalism 
of the ‘information security manager.' In developing nations such as South Africa, black hat theft 
and the resultant financial fleecing of the victims has led to the ranking of the country as the 
seventh of the fifty most affected nations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Brodie, 2014). 
The vulnerability exists due to the recent accessibility of the web via mobile devices by most 
South Africans, and for companies using personal computers, the lack of proper security 
installations gives easy entry to the hackers (Brodie, 2014). For this reason, countries in need of 
superior economic progress need to install information security systems that match the changing 
face of technology that hackers easily command (Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff, 2009). It is clear that 
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information protection is no longer a vestige for ICT but the entire economic performance of a 
corporate institution, especially in finance (Dlamini et al., 2009). 
Problem Statement 
The lack of regulations to safeguard data privacy in developing countries is a serious 
issue compared to developed countries. These concerns further intensify when considering 
Microfinance as a sector which is most popular in developing countries where privacy 
regulations are at a minimum. Therefore, there is a higher possibility of privacy violations in 
these communities with the increasing involvement of new technologies where large amounts of 
consumer data are being used. Making an articulation to the privacy concerns that have been 
rising in the global stage, it will be necessary for companies’ especially international 
corporations such as Apple, to guarantee privacy and confidentiality of customer/consumer 
data/information. As such, with this research study, the researcher will facilitate the identification 
of critical privacy regulations in many developing nations as well as some developed countries 
that ought to be subject to address these issues to ensure the limited loss of data/information. 
Research Objectives 
1. This research project seeks to highlight through case studies the level of enforcement 
of information security and privacy laws in both developed and developing countries. 
The main focus in the developed world will be the implementation of GLBA law of 
1999 in the US as well as the impact of the General Data Protection Regulation in the 
European Union. At least 6 case studies from Africa and Asia will provide details of 
the level of effective use of the draft data protection laws for the regions' micro-
finance and finance institutions.  
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2. The study will also quantify the level of awareness of privacy and data protection 
laws in developing countries. Details from such countries as Nigeria, Uganda, and 
Ghana will provide data on how the customers of micro-finance institutions of the 
respective nations approach inputting data online. 
3. With outdated technology being the major bottleneck of implementation of data 
protection and privacy laws, it is also the objective of the research to review how 
financial institutions have kept up with technological changes. Critical areas of 
examination will be the adoption of a new set of regulations to reflect the switch from 
privacy laws that were written before the Internet age. The regions under review 
include Africa and South-east Asia.   
4. While comparing the data protection and security policies across developed and 
developing countries, the study will also examine significant data breaches of recent 
times. Some of these will include the Morgan Stanley customer data compromise of 
2012 to 2014, the South Korea telecommunication hacking, and breaches in Africa. 
Purpose of the Study 
Advocating for improvement in data security, confidentiality, and privacy is a necessity 
for any company and governments around the globe. Most data losses in various developing 
nations usually result in enormous financial losses that in essence impact the economy. With this 
research study, the comparison between the security and data regulations implemented by 
developed and developing nations generates the required and significant issues that ought to be 
addressed to enable the eventual attainment of better global consumer/customer protection 
mechanisms. 
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The purpose of the study is to compare data protection and privacy regulation laws of 
developed countries with those of other countries. The study will examine the European Union's 
GDPR and the US GLBA, as some of the two key legislation for data regulation, globally. Three 
foci of the study will be (1) To review the privacy and data protection measures that finance and 
micro-finance institutions have put up to adhere to privacy regulations of their respective 
countries or regions.  (2) Based on the financial loss magnitude per country's financial sector, it 
is the purpose of this study to illustrate that most of the losses that occur in such areas as micro-
finance or mobile banking take place through lax implementation, misuse or non-existence of 
such laws (Abdulrauf, 2016). For instance, the study will touch upon Nigeria's $550 million 
losses as a result of lax enforcement of data protection laws in its mobile banking sector (Baur-
Yazbck et al., 2017). (3) The study also seeks to reveal that keeping up with technological 
changes in the banking sector in developing countries such as Malaysia is a salvaging point for 
the better protection of privacy in the digital age. It is apparent that many of the developing 
nations still use their 1990s laws (Shuhidan, Hamidi, & Saleh, 2017). 
Finally, it is the purpose of the study, through sample comparisons between developed 
and developing nations, to reveal that data breaches can still happen internally when an insider 
leads to the exposure of corporate data to potential hackers (Security Exchange Commission, 
2016). Case studies of such breaches will serve as an illustration of the need to come up with 
new policies in both developed and developing countries to handle information security. 
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Research Questions 
The study will have three research questions, namely: 
1. How effective are the information security measures and privacy regulations of 
developed versus developing countries in the financial sector? 
2. As evidenced by the case study results, how effectively have finance institutions 
enforced the privacy and data protection laws in their jurisdictions? 
3. Since part of the reasons financial institutions adopt privacy and data regulation 
policies is to reduce financial losses, how effective are these based on case study 
results of financial breaches? 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
Information security laws differ in diverse demographic and economic regions of the 
globe. For instance, in much of the developed world, data security laws are an integral mandate 
for all firms while other nations enforce them for only as much as they shield financial 
institutions from the legal outcomes of compromises (Miskam & Shahwahid, 2014). Irrespective 
of the jurisdiction, electronic transfer of banking data and holding the same on servers has 
become a necessity (Hamidovic, 2014). For the above reasons, it follows that many countries 
have fawned laws that categorize the identity of such information and the consequences of 
sensitive data transfer (Hamidovic, 2014). This is out of the belief that information is liable to 
lose much of its privacy and be prone to diverse kinds of breaching when it assumes an 
electronic format (Sarabi, Naghizadeh, Liu, & Liu, 2016).   
Around 18 individuals suffer from a cyber-spying incident every second, which adds up 
to the one and a half million worldwide incidents per day (Cohen, 2014). The developing 
countries suffer most of the brunt because of the lapse of time before the setup of information 
system laws. For instance, rising economies like China, the Indian subcontinent and some parts 
of south-east Asia ratified their information security laws as late as early this decade (Cohen, 
2014). In the financial sector, the developing world is also the most affected because of 
bewilderment on which areas to regulate. A case in point is the slow formulation of data laws in 
certain countries on electronic pay cards (Johnson, Lincke, Imhof, & Lim, 2014). Still, nations 
like Brazil were as late as 2014 deliberating on regulating cyber laws around these payment 
systems (Johnson et al., 2014). Another South American nation, Argentina, by 2013 still had not 
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put in place particular clauses to govern Internet privacy through ensuring protection on cookie 
information and sensitive consumer data (Craig et al., 2013). 
Even in the first world nations, there are still high likelihoods of data manipulation, 
especially during the introduction of new networks. For instance, Australia has a privacy law, but 
it is not as strict as the EU counterpart in that a financial institution does not have to inform the 
authorities of every act of mining consumer data as long as the latter is notified (Craig et al., 
2013).  The proposal to offer uncharged public scale Internet also poses a threat to information 
security, despite the existing strong laws, due to multi-network routing (European Union Agency 
for Network and Information Security, 2014). One such system that is set to roll out in Europe in 
the mid-2020s sets out to offer zero-charged Internet to the public of the member states (Pham, 
Galic, & Taylor, 2017). The inherent threat is that public cyberspace is easier to breach when it is 
free for everyone to access than one secured intranet (Pham et al., 2017). In light of the above 
details, this literature review will focus on holistic international privacy laws and how they apply 
to two key related sectors. These include financial institutions and micro-financial institutions. 
The scope will be the developed and developing world. Each section will offer the latest literary 
input on the subject. 
Financial Industry and Micro-finance 
The first area in which to explore the financial industry as it is cognizant of privacy laws 
in the United States. The financial sector is a key driver of the country's economy (Mohammed, 
2015). This is the reason the GLB Act of 1999 specifies that US banks ought to notify customers 
on how they intend to handle their private data (Walrath, 2017). The Act governs how banks 
disseminate private data to external agents that the customer does not directly relate to, 
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especially about security cards and account details (Mohammed, 2015). Its strengths include full 
disclosure by banks to clients (Walrath, 2017). Despite being more advanced than similar acts in 
developing nations, there are limitations of this law's applicability in a changing financial context 
(Walrath, 2017). 
In Europe's financial sector, some of the strictest rules on information security are already 
in force (Baker, 2016). Not only do banking institutions get into the spotlight in their own 
countries but in the European Union economic bloc (Baker, 2016). For instance, the very core of 
their businesses, namely the acquisition of customers is under scrutiny from the various angles of 
privacy, fraud, and ethics (Baker, 2016). Even when customers are likely to be the perpetrators of 
the crimes, some laws, like the United Kingdom's PRA, delve into the accountability of a bank in 
its behavior to its clientele. This is in recognition of the opinion that a profit-making entity may 
manipulate consumer data unscrupulously for gain (Baker, 2016). 
The financial industry in developing nations faces serious information breaches due to 
still immature policies. In South Africa, for instance, data compromises are inside jobs that 
involve banks' Information Technology staff (Ngcamu, 2016). A case study by Ngcamu (2016), 
highlighted that the dearth of non-disclosure contracts led to staff misuse of information outside 
the company. The financial institution in question also was a pacesetter in not apportioning 
information risk as a part of its risk management mandate (Ngcamu, 2016). 
Another developing world context is that of Indonesia. The financial institutions of the 
south-east Asian nation still concentrate on the past laws that govern cyber data and privacy 
(Palupy, 2011). Most companies still utilize the outdated clauses despite the quick disruptions in 
software that have visited upon the banking sector in recent years (Palupy, 2011). Across the 
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borders, Singaporean and Indonesian banking sectors are having to bow to governmental 
pressure to sufficiently protect their consumers. In Singapore, the laws are evolving from mainly 
governmental controls to flexible regulations that allow private financial institutions to join the 
latest protection initiatives (Palupy, 2011). 
About the micro-finance sector, developing nations' micro institutions struggle to survive 
due to both financial and poor regulatory matters (Fotabong, 2012). For instance in Cameroon,  
since early this decade the failure rate of major companies in 2010 not necessarily affiliated to 
data breaching has led to increased government involvement to avert future closures (Fotabong, 
2012). A primary method of affordable technology that micro-financial institutions in Cameroon 
use are mobile, which due to its widespread use generates a high level of data vulnerability 
(Mwafise & Stapleton, 2012). One of the major reasons for the adoption is the development of a 
telecom-based money remittance system (Mwafise & Stapleton, 2012).  The same study found 
that of all the factors that led to the widespread utility of the service,  privacy  (at 96.8%) and 
restrictions to user data (92.5%) came at numbers four and five after such factors as simplicity 
(100%), confidentiality (100%) and trust (Mwafise & Stapleton, 2012). This highlighted that 
privacy is still in the developing stage even in the users' contexts in the country. 
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Figure 1: Factors influencing the adoption of mobile money transfer in Cameroon. 
In developed societies, such as Europe, the major information security factor that governs 
the few operating micro-institutions' data security is a WiFi network (European Union Agency 
for Network and Information Security, 2014). The networks that most banks use includes WiFi 
which if unsecured with passwords poses privacy risks for the users. The fact that many financial 
bodies have operations across country boundaries means multi-jurisdictional access to customer 
data and hence multiplied vulnerability. To overcome these variances, the European jurisdictions 
have sought to unify the information security bills to overcome conflict of interest, across 
borders (European Union Agency for Network and Information Security, 2014). Due to the 
advancement of cyber laws in the EU setting, what remains is to secure the loopholes in the 
networks, which means the routing paths that information flows from small institutes to large 
banks after customers send in their requests (European Union Agency for Network and 
Information Security, 2014). The figure below illustrates the exposed network paths. 
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Therefore, even as financial and micro-finance institutions execute various measures to 
ensure data privacy, there are still missing gaps in both developed and developing nations.  
Figure 2: Sample financial institutions network path. 
 
The world, for instance, the connectivity of data along multiple bank communication 
paths increases the manifold severity of a breach should it happen (Camillo, 2016; European 
Union Agency for Network and Information Security, 2014). Studies in recent times reveal that 
banks that take a trio of steps, inclusive of in-house, external and network harmonization can 
stem the tide of network breaches (Camillo, 2016). This is especially true of companies that 
operate in a highly interconnected system that demands different legal implementation of 
conflicting information security protocols. 
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International Privacy Regulations 
The modern privacy laws have a foundation in Scandinavia. In 1973, Sweden published 
its initial privacy clause, which set the way for other countries to prepare similar all-
encompassing laws (Booysen & Neo, 2017). By the first quarter of 2016, a hundred and ten 
similar bills had become institutionalized in as many nations. This was more than two additional 
nations per year that ratified their laws similarly (Booysen & Neo, 2017). Banking institutions 
were the first to embrace this form of information security through their in-house tax and cash 
revenue matters (Mello, 2012). They would soon find complications when they crossed borders 
as each sovereign state had a law a little different from the home country, ideally meaning that 
unscrupulous secrecy would not work (Mello, 2012). This is despite the fact that privacy laws 
serve the same objective (Booysen & Neo, 2017).  
Privacy laws in all sectors began in earnest in the 1800s when governments would use 
records to surveil over their citizens (Solove, 2006). The request for privacy details during each 
population count led to grumbling about privacy. The institutionalization of law in the second 
half of the 1800s to cease invasion of public data in the United States' census was one outcome 
of this trend (Solove, 2006). 
The first evidence of laws governing technological breach of privacy was in the liberal 
age of the 1960s (Kenyon, 2016). One such act was the use of extensions to record another 
party's telephone messages, which led to privacy clauses against telephonic tapping (Solove, 
2006). The 1990s saw the rise of the Internet with equal fear of financial breaches during the 
dot.com era, and the US GLB Act was a culmination of decade-long online confidentiality acts 
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(Walrath, 2017). The primary law of the current century is the EU privacy or GDPR which will 
apply fully in 2018 among European member states (Allen & Overy LLP, 2017). 
Table 1 
Comparative Timelines of the Medium and Use of General Privacy Laws from the 1800s to 
2010s 
 
Timeline of Privacy laws Medium Use 
1800-1899 Paper records, post & telegraph. State surveillance (Solove, 
2006). 
1900-1960 Public systems, telephone, state 
records. 
To prevent legal privacy torts 
and to enhance federal 
espionage (Solove, 2006). 
1960-1990 The constitution, information 
acts of the 1960s, espionage 
privacy laws of the 1970s, 
computer laws of the late 1980s 
and audio-visual privacy laws 
of the late 1980s (Solove, 2006) 
The rise of the '60s 
technological liberalism led to 
numerous constitutional acts 
while the coming of the 
computer led to the ratification 
of new laws (Kenyon, 2016; 
Solove, 2006). 
The 90s The Internet GLB Act (1999) in the US and 
numerous web-based privacy 
bills (Walrath, 2017). 
2000-2018 Internet, cloud Numerous privacy acts on 
security after 9/11 (Lane, 2014). 
The EU's new Internet privacy 
laws are coming into effect 
mid-May 2018 (Allen & Overy 
LLP, 2017). 
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One of the remarkable problems of the current international privacy regulations is the 
lack of harmonization across countries (Allen & Overy LLP, 2017; Bu-Pasha, 2017). This is 
important especially in the background of the fact that much data is seamless and universal to 
apply due to the development of a similar Internet worldwide (Bu-Pasha, 2017). The latest 
offering to bridge this gap is the harmonized EU law that takes effect in mid-May, 2018 (Allen & 
Overy LLP, 2017). From that date, all continental privacy framework will supersede the select 
country equivalents (Allen & Overy LLP, 2017). 
Despite emanating from the biggest financial and trading duo in the world, US privacy 
legacy is markedly disparate from its European counterpart (Movius & Krup, 2009). The US 
emphasizes local financial institutions, but it does not have as stringent regulation as the EU 
(Movius & Krup, 2009). Therefore, whenever there are tradeoffs of information during a cross-
Atlantic deal, any consequences of privacy become challenging to resolve unless there is court 
intervention (VanWasshnova, 2008). For instance, the discovery of the 2006 clandestine 
passenger espionage program by the US in Europe led to the condemnation of privacy data 
breaching by the court (VanWasshnova, 2008). This is despite the two continents putting enough 
protection measures against financial breaches in their respective institutions (Movius & Krup, 
2009). 
Just like the rest of the world has different information security and privacy bills, so are 
developing countries. In Africa, principally Lesotho, the laws are still in the development stage 
despite being encompassed in a regional bloc (Makulilo & Mophethe, 2016). The country passed 
its latest act in 2011, but this would likely undergo revisiting after regional bodies like the 
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trading community of South African states evolved policies and required member countries to 
update theirs (Makulilo & Mophethe, 2016). 
Naude (2014), states that South Africa has had a poor record in the enactment of privacy 
clauses to keep its digital citizenry safe. However, a 2013 bill sought to transform the country's 
track record with the entrenchment of international elements (Naude, 2014). These included the 
perpetual updating of the laws to stay up-to-date with the ever-upgrading technology that leaves 
behind old laws (Naude, 2014). A case study in 2008 of the biggest users of computers, 
comprising of corporate leaders, technology personnel and other employees in South Africa 
found that restriction to computer access by outsiders was only enforced at 57% levels (Stander, 
Dunnet, & Rizzo, 2008). However, the biggest means of protection were Internet security 
programs at a level of 98% (Stander et al., 2008). Fifty-three percent of participants also 
indicated that their security personnel enforced data protection checks (Stander et al., 2008). 
Despite this outcome, the study concluded that the legal protection mechanisms do not read the 
same page with the technological changes responsible for the breaches (Stander et al., 2008). 
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Figure 3: Type of in-house data protection in South Africa in 2008.  
 
In short, though there is a rising global need to shield the privacy of users in, especially 
sensitive fields like finance, the international regulations have been pragmatic (Sorensen, 2017). 
Each state except for regional bodies, like the EU, have fawned different jurisdictional 
frameworks (Bu-Pasha, 2017). Harmonization will be the one recommendation for filling the gap 
of these different laws that regulate similar devices, software and data breaches worldwide (Bu-
Pasha, 2017; Sorensen, 2017). 
Privacy Regulations and Policies in the Finance Sector 
The rise of soft money remittances is one of the major factors for privacy regulations in 
the finance sector. For instance, in 2016, five hundred billion soft cash exchanges took place 
around the world, which acted as a catalyst to the need to safeguard the senders' and recipients' 
data (Carbo-Valverde, 2016). 
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For the above reason, a country-by-country review on privacy rules on banking can 
provide new insights into the importance governments have placed on online banking. For 
instance, Singapore's 2014 promulgation on the individual's right to information security 
provided that a business that spammed a client with unwanted e-commerce missives would elicit 
a monetary fine (Raul, 2014). In the same year, Russia imposed mandatory upkeep of all data, 
financial or otherwise, within the country's servers (Raul, 2014). China would follow suit with a 
cybersecurity law that came up in 2017 that stipulates the localization of secret information 
(Brink, Wang, Veldhoen, & Arnbak, 2017). The epitome of all privacy laws remains that of 
Europe's 'Data Protection Regulation' (Raul, 2014), which many other nations have either tried to 
imitate or shunned, altogether. 
The major privacy regulation law in the US is GLBA. It regulates the disbursement or 
storage of consumer data by banks (Sheng & Cranor, 2012). It also governs the use of factual 
data, puts a limit on workers' information access by outsiders and expects banks to install 
information security processes to keep data safe (Sheng & Cranor, 2012). 
A 1999 to 2005 longitudinal survey on the pressure finance sector players in the United 
States face from the enactment of GLBA law revealed mixed outcomes (Sheng & Cranor, 2012). 
Though many banks were of the view that information regulation was paramount to safeguard 
consumer information, there was counter-argument for the need to relax the rules (Sheng & 
Cranor, 2012). The study concluded that even in the US the regulations did not have much effect 
as small finance entities still shared customers' data with affiliated companies (Sheng & Cranor, 
2012). On average, the largest ten finance institutions and retail outlets in the survey shared 
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consumer data one hundred percent with affiliates, 40 to 80% with non-affiliates and gave 
consumers opting-out options of between 40 and 100% magnitudes. 
Figure 4: How banks and retailers transfer data with affiliates and non-affiliates in the US.  
 
Another important legal recourse for consumers about travesties on their privacy by 
outsiders or banks is the 'Electronic Fund Transfer Act' (Mohammed, 2015). It came about as a 
result of the increase in non-cash remittances (Carbo-Verde, 2016). The law is under 
implementation in diverse states in different forms including in governing mobile and electronic 
card transactions (Budnitz, 2016; Mohammed, 2015). It covers all kinds of gadgets, some of 
which are hinted upon such as smartphones when they feature in financial issues involving user 
information (Budnitz, 2016). The privacy policy of EFTA is to the effect that the custodians of 
the points of sale and automated teller machines notify the authorities in situations where 
consumer data undergoes unscrupulous access (Mohammed, 2015). This is important because 
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automated payment devices are not manned and thus may not have a person directly responsible 
for stolen information (Mohammed, 2015). 
Privacy policy and regulations in developing countries are significantly behind those of 
the developed ones. For instance, South Africa has the ECT Act of the early 2000s that still 
governs how e-banking takes care of web consumers (Kabanda, 2010; Mtuze, 2015). It is 
interesting that before 2002 when the law came up, the country's e-bankers had no clear 
guidelines on how financial communique online held the sender legally liable to the message 
(Kabanda, 2010). The gist of this new clause is that Internet portals of institutions engaged in e-
commerce ought to have overt and covert manifestations on how they maintain the 
confidentiality of their clients' information (Mtuze, 2015). The overt part is the presence of 
privacy policy widgets at the nether part of banks' online databases to reveal their exact stand on 
client data protection (Kabanda, 2010). A survey by Kabanda (2010), in the late 2000s, found 
that South Africans had very low trust in their banking data repositories as they felt that the 
institutions only enforced select ECT stipulations. 
In Nigeria, the privacy laws exist, but they are blunt to the essence that institutions only 
enforce them by having a privacy officer in place (Patricia & Izuchukwu, 2014). The first fully-
fledged legal recourse that captured the modern rise of technology in finance was 2006's e-
banking rules or 'E-Electronic Banking' (Ezeoha, 2006). They laid out grounds for broad areas of 
Internet-based breaches of information security not covered before (Ezeoha, 2006). Despite the 
law, the country's banking institutions still carry out the 'know your clients' (Abdulrauf, 2016) 
policy as a formality, sometimes without regard to the regulations. This is a precondition that for 
the banks to provide optimal services, they ought to mine some necessary data of their customer 
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base without breaching their privacy. Often, they take extra information which amounts to a 
contravention of the stipulations on client protection (Abdulrauf, 2016). 
Asia's developing economies such as that of India are also behind their Western peers, 
mainly European, on privacy policies around finance (Jamil & Khan, 2011). India ranks as one 
of the biggest outsourcing nations globally and hence the high need for banking institutions to 
safeguard users who transact trade online (Directo, 2014). The existing act is 'IT Act 2000' (Jamil 
& Khan, 2011). It underwent new amendments in recent years following the promulgation of 
PDPB, a bill that came up to the national assembly in 2006 to offer EU-like privacy on all 
aspects of online life, not just banking (Jamil & Khan, 2011). In a 2011 survey, 26% of CFOs in 
corporations around the world specified India as the best country for offshore task delivery 
(Directo, 2014). The same survey also unveiled that Western entities could easily alter this 
preference and seek outsourcing elsewhere were India's privacy laws not to change from their 
developing phase (Directo, 2014). 
Some of the very different recent privacy laws are from emerging economies, principally 
China. The country in 2017 promulgated its collective set of regulations on 'cybersecurity' (Brink 
et al., 2017). What is disparate from its Western counterparts is that the regulation is highly 
information security-oriented in that it targets data compromises that come from outside its 
national borders (Brink et al., 2017). For this reason, the law stipulates that individuals and banks 
keep their sensitive data in country-based servers rather than abroad (KPMG, 2017). Another 
stipulation is that although financial institutions and individuals may have the right to keep their 
information confidential, the state has the power to request for data that it deems sensitive (Brik 
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et al., 2017). Table 2 summarizes the new stipulations for financial and other entities operating 
within China in 2018. 
Table 2 
 
China's New Cybersecurity Law of 2017 Summary 
 
Regulation Effect 
Internal data protection Use of better data protection methods through 
the installation of information security systems 
for China-based companies. (Brink et al., 2017). 
Personnel Recruitment of information security personnel 
or network operators, per business, to enforce 
network protection (Brink et al., 2017; KPMG, 
2017). 
Privacy  Storage, transmission and consensual use of 
customer data per the new law (Brink et al., 
2017) 
Privacy across borders  Institutions to keep in mind the probability of 
information being leaked, lost or spied upon by 
foreigners and thus the need for in-country 
storage (Brink et al., 2017; KPMG, 2017) 
 
The above section has highlighted that the sector still needs to promulgate more laws to 
keep up with the changing face of online banking, especially in upcoming markets in Africa and 
Asia.  Zahoor, Ud-din, and Sunami (2016), reiterate this point in their report that the finance 
sector attracts more hackers than all other industries. The latest minefields of consumer data that 
criminals go on to use; include electronic payment devices, automated teller machines, and even 
direct leakage of a customer's banking identity (Zahoor et al., 2016). 
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As the case of China's new privacy regulations show, it is a legal expectation to maintain 
consumer data internally through the employment of data security officers (Brink et al., 2017).  
For this to happen in developing nations, which are currently ill-equipped to meet the challenge, 
there needs a training program by the banks on data protection (Tse et al., 2013). Through their 
survey on global banking institutions that implemented such education, Tse et al. (2013) found 
that in 2012, no more than 47% of the participants had put in place training initiatives to handle 
data enlightenment for their staff members. Of these, 37% set their information security and 
privacy policies to guide their third-party relations on data protection (Tse et al., 2013). 
Therefore, it is apparent that global financial institutions need vibrant training of their staff as a 
starting point to realize their privacy aims. 
Privacy in the Micro-finance Sector 
The regulation of micro-finance institutions takes many forms and mostly affects the 
developing regions of the world. Despite this essence, data privacy is still informal in many 
countries (Egboro, 2015). In Nigeria, for instance, while there are ethical approaches by major 
banks to client data, these rules do not apply to micro-finance (Egboro, 2015). Indeed, these 
institutions discuss consumer data in boardrooms, which puts the data at risk of leakage (Egboro, 
2015). 
The nearest equivalent in the EU is e-banking and mobile transactions, which the E-
money ordinance already covers (Pouchous, 2012). The law guides for a limited period of the 
retention of customer details after which it undergoes annihilation (Lumsden, 2013; Pouchous, 
2012). In the United States, the closest form of micro-finance is also mobile finance. It is 
essential in privacy regulations emanated from the fact that by 2013, cellular gadgets had 
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replaced existing telephones per home by a margin of 31.6% (Lumsden, 2013). Whereas in the 
EU companies have a finite time of keeping consumer data after which it is deleted, in the US 
firms can hold confidential details of cellular subscribers indefinitely (Lumsden, 2013). For this 
reason, legal agitators in the country have been calling for a stricter law than the current one 
about the exact period to keep such sensitive data until it is destroyed (Lumsden, 2013). 
To govern information security in e-banking, the US currently enforces the 'Cyberspace 
Policy' (Lumsden, 2013). In privacy and mobile telemarketing, the US Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) rule provides many stipulations on the use of limits to consumer data. For 
instance, marketing directly ought to have an opt-in or out option imposed on network 
companies, but this does not apply to non-affiliates (King, 2008). Though, it is criminal for the 
latter to use the data to pretext consumers (King, 2008). The use of consumer information is an 
on 'as is' basis, which implies that the mobile banker can store and transfer the customer's details 
but only up to the limit where there is personal consent (King, 2008). There is no regulation for 
non-affiliates and manufacturers of gadgets though it is criminal to pretext (King, 2008). The 
chart below outlines the above stipulations. 
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Figure 5: Regulatory areas in mobile banking in the US. 
In most parts of the developing world, bills to protect clients' information privacy have 
been snail-paced in comparison to their European e-banking counterparts (Pouchous, 2012). 
Only states in south-east Asia such as Indonesia have been on the forefront in recent years to 
promote privacy and other protection policies due to the rapid digitization of the micro-finance 
niche (Pouchous, 2012). In Kenya, the development of mobile payments has also colluded with 
over-dependence on the mobile device as a banking tool (Pouchous, 2012). However, the very 
simplicity of mobile utility puts the often technologically uninformed Kenyan customer at risk 
(Pouchous, 2012). 
 Sub-saharan Africa is one of the critical regions as far as micro banking is concerned to 
cater for the low earnings bracket in need of banking (Arun & Murinde, 2010). The introduction 
of privacy regulation has been embraced since the late 2000s due to the emergence of electronic 
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and phone-based transactions that may undermine data confidentiality (Arun & Murinde, 2010). 
One of the factors that are under regulation is the social capital of the client. For instance, in 
Mauritius, there is a clause that gives microfinance institutions the ability to process the user's 
data to find the latter's eligibility to access the banking service. The clause also guides on the 
limits of such an investigation (Arun & Murinde 2010). Most other nations in the continent apart 
from South Africa had no such law in 2010 (Arun & Murinde, 2010). Nigeria, on the other hand, 
lacks laws to specifically regulate the microfinance outlets despite their being present in many 
cities (Oluyombo, 2007). The country's 1952 law on banking bypassed mention of the term 
'microfinance' and so do latter-day clauses in the late 2000s (Oluyombo, 2007). 
Uganda, on its part, despite the proliferation of new forms of micro banking has been a 
slow implementer of privacy laws. By 2016, there was still a lack of an information security 
clause to govern privacy (Privacy International, 2016). The country's information docket 
proposed such a bill in 2014, but to date, the passage of a drafted copy is yet to come to light 
(Privacy International, 2016). The country's governing privacy laws are mostly international in 
nature and surround issues on human rights rather than data (Privacy International, 2016). 
Ugandans are most likely to disclose their private details to banking sites only when there are 
over details that enhance trust, including the presence of a privacy statement on the website's 
page (Mwesigwa, 2010). There has been low progress in embracing e-banking because of doubts 
about privacy regulations and the perceptions of low information security online by the majority 
of the unbanked customers (Mwesigwa, 2010). Due to the lack of such laws, the reliance on 
perceptions on risks has become the main indicator of whether to use an online banking service 
or not in Uganda (Mwesigwa, 2010). The diagram below illustrates such perceptions.  
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Figure 6: Risks due to lack of privacy laws in micro-finance in Uganda. 
In South American nations, micro-finance is under regulation albeit in mainly financial 
points of view such as deposit disclosure information (Ardic, Ibrahim, & Mylenko, 2011). Chile, 
however, passed the 1999 law known as 'Protection of Privacy' (Ardic et al., 2011). A recent 
proposed update to the bill was to the effect that banks, micro or large, still using outdated laws 
and needed to translate them to the technological age (Carey & Silva, 2016). Table 3 
comparatively summarizes the latest points that the new law stipulates. 
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Table 3 
 
Privacy Data Laws on Micro and Mainstream Banking in Chile 
 
1999 Privacy Law 2016-17 proposed update bill 
The law specified written acceptance to banks' 
use of consumer data. 
This may change from 'written' to technological 
transmission of data in the digital banking age 
(Carey & Silva, 2016). 
The current privacy regulation has no clear 
definitions of what is exempted from client 
consent to give details to banks. 
The new law may configure if consent exempts 
such currently undefined purposes as the in-
house use of customer data, among others 
(Carey & Silva, 2016). 
Unconditional consenting exists in the current 
law. 
Unconditional consenting will receive an update 
to include client acceptance of the use of their 
data by institutions, via diverse mediums like 
the internet (Carey & Silva, 2016). 
 
In Asia, privacy laws have been around since the 1990s, but they are still developing in 
many countries (Greenleaf, 2014). In Taiwan, there have been many instances of fines imposed 
on small and large banking venues for breaching consumers' sensitive data (Greenleaf, 2014). A 
case in point was when two banks faced fines that amounted to a hundred and thirty thousand 
dollars separately. Their reason was for the exposure of their clients' banking details to criminals 
who hacked into their systems (Greenleaf, 2014). Thus, there are ties between information 
security and privacy in Taiwanese laws. Around Asia, the term privacy has multiple meanings, 
but each country interprets it through its court system, which determines what constitutes data 
compromises, especially when there are doubts (Greenleaf, 2014; Kershaw, 2014). This is 
because there are usually few precedents to use due to the rapid progress of technology that 
requires regular updates of privacy rules (Kershaw, 2014). 
 In the Philippines, all rules are governed by the 'Data Privacy Act 2011' (Government of 
Philippines, 2014). The adoption of the law was the first of its kind as it embraced the many 
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entities with online databases including state and private (Government of Philippines, 2014). The 
clause concerns universal information confidentiality, but it applies to the microfinance sector in 
the way the institutions mine and disburse clients' data (Sahu, 2018). The clause stipulates that 
the micro-banking institution can only gather and transfer personal details under the 
authorization of the customer who is the official custodian of such information (Sahu, 2018).  
The law defines the confidential data as familial, spiritual, ethical or stance-related. It also 
categorizes personal health status as a part of banking details that can only be transferred through 
the individual's consent (Sahu, 2018). 
Information security and privacy have become inseparable in recent times due to the 
increment of breaches even in the microfinance setting. Gyabi and Shrivas (2016), presents a 
case of how community banks in a West African context find ties between privacy and 
information security. In a Ghanaian rural background, the government enforces information 
technology policies to streamline confidentiality and to ensure the low vulnerability of 
microfinance clients' data (Gyabi & Shrivas, 2016). Thus, it is a requirement that community-
level small banks to carry out frequent system auditing to assess the likelihood of system attacks. 
The above case study assessed that the small financial outlets found system threats 
insurmountable and even in situations where a hacking act happened, they might not necessarily 
be well equipped to alert the customer of the outcome (Gyabi & Shrivas, 2016). The survey on a 
broad number of customers in the above setting returned the results as follows: 37% of the 
respondents replied that the strongest privacy and data protection policy their small banks 
enforced was the password. 17% identified the DataPro software as in use by their microfinance 
institutions to mitigate information leakage. Only 12% replied that there was a strong use of an 
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access restriction rule, while 9% specified that their small banks had computer usage policies 
(Gyabi & Srhivas, 2016). The chart below highlights the above results from the survey. 
 
Figure 7: Survey results in Ghana in 2016 on information security and privacy measures in rural 
microfinance. 
  
Therefore, micro-finance, despite being a catalyst for development in the unbanked 
communities of the Third World, poses a threat to consumer data due to the slow implementation 
of data protection regulations. Most rules in South America, apart from Chile, are broad 
sweeping and do not have reconnaissance on the changing phase of online privacy in 
microfinance (Ardic et al., 2011). In Asia, despite efforts by some states to implement the laws to 
keep up with the alterations in cyber technology, some countries still use their 1990s' policies 
(Greenleaf, 2014). African states are still underdeveloped in microfinance laws, and in certain 
countries like Uganda, the rules are yet to exist even though the institutions bank the majority of 
the rural customers (Mwesigwa, 2010).  
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The Conclusion to Literature Review 
From the above sections, it is apparent that information security and privacy is one of the 
most important measures that banks and microfinance institutions currently implement 
(Hamidovic, 2014). The study has enunciated the prevalence of strict laws in the European 
Union that safeguard the keeping, retrieval and the deletion of a customer's sensitive information. 
The economic bloc also currently has one of the strongest set of privacy rules in the world that 
member countries will superimpose over their sovereign legislations by mid-May 2018 (Allen & 
Overy LLP, 2017). 
In the United States, data protection is mainly a mandate of the GBL Act of 1999 which 
came up at the height of the dot.com era (Sheng & Cranor, 2012). The law still applies even 
today despite lax conformity by some finance outlets due to the rise of new forms of technology 
(Sheng & Cranor, 2012). One of these is e-banking, which is the closest form to microfinance in 
the developed world. 
The literature has revealed that the bulk of privacy non-implementation is due to either 
bank laxity or lack of the rules in the developing world. Nigeria's micro-finance establishments, 
for example, treat consumer details in an open manner not only during transactions but in board 
discussions (Egboro, 2015). In Uganda, a 2014 proposed privacy bill be yet to come into law two 
years later (Privacy International, 2016). Though efforts are apparent in south-east Asia, where 
countries are instituting bills to replace old 1990s' laws in the background of new technology, the 
sector is yet to unfold in comparison to the West (Greenleaf, 2014). 
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Chapter 3: Methodology (Mixed Method Approach) 
Introduction 
The study will entail a mixed methodology with both quantitative and qualitative 
elements. The research will review case studies from Internet sites, databases, and peer-reviewed 
journals. Each section will compare the enforcement of information security or privacy laws in 
sample cases in developed and developing countries. The first variable will be the presence of 
privacy laws in the country under the case study. The second variable will be the degree of 
enforcement of information security in the country under the survey.  The dependent variable 
will be the degree of effectiveness of privacy laws according to the adoption by microfinance or 
finance sectors of the given jurisdiction. The effectiveness measure can include low information 
security breaches. 
Case Studies on Financial Sector Privacy 
 
Case study in a developed country. In the US in 2015, Morgan Stanley faced an 
allegation for breaching the data of hundreds of thousands of customers through an internal 
worker (Federal Trade Commission, 2015). The case's complexity emanated from the fact that 
the banking institution had implemented all privacy rules per the United States GBLA and other 
FTC guidelines. It was also notable that the access of sensitive data was limited to staff members 
up to the extent that they needed it for corporate purposes (Federal Trade Commission, 2015). 
The complication came up because the worker exposed over seven hundred and thirty thousand 
accounts to professional hackers (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2016). 
A case in point was that the individual was able to access the report repository and 
transfer the data to an intranet database at a personal residence (Federal Trade Commission, 
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2015). The data would later find its way into dongles and other individual gadgets, a 
contravention of the bank's privacy policies (Federal Trade Commission, 2015). From there it 
dispersed online through a third-party act of hacking where the affected individuals' details were 
under auction (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2016). The federal body intervened to 
rule whether to follow the banker's counterargument of one of its workers inadvertently hacking 
criminally into its system or whether the banker was responsible for the exposure of a client's 
privacy through weak data storage. 
Tesco bank breach–UK. In November 2016, Tesco Bank was subjected to a hack that 
saw £2.5 million stolen off from 9,000 of its accounts in what some security experts are 
describing as the most serious, attack ever to hit the United Kingdom's banking sector.  As 
described by Frost (2017) in her article, the attack is believed to have encountered through its 
online banking system, affecting 20,000 accounts in total. The attack had targeted a weekend, 
where banks are generally slow to react to online threats while the stolen money was then used to 
buy thousands of goods from worldwide retailers using the contactless mobile-phone payment 
method. 
As put forward by Jones (2016) in the article on the guardian website, the author claims 
that as found by an academic team the criminals have used merchants’ payment websites to guess 
people’s card details. More elaboratively the criminals use software that automatically generates 
different variations of a card’s security data–for example, the card number, expiry date and three-
digit security code known as the CVV–and fires these off to hundreds or even thousands of 
websites around the world at the same time. The reply to the transaction would confirm whether 
or not the guess was right. 
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The bank had adhered to the Regulation 61 of the Payment Services Regulations 2009 in 
the UK and paid refunded its affected customers £2.5 million. The regulation above requires a 
bank to refund the amount of an unauthorized payment transaction to the payer and to restore the 
debited payment account to the state it would have been in had the unauthorized payment 
transaction not taken place. Furthermore, UK's Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) could have 
considered the breach of Principle 3 of its Principles for Businesses. Under this principle, a firm 
must take reasonable care to organize and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with 
adequate risk management systems. This will raise questions as to whether adequate protection 
against the risk posed by evolving forms of cybercrime was in place at Tesco Bank. If a failure in 
this area is established there is the possibility that the bank will face a substantial financial 
penalty, although this has been yet to be decided. 
Australia: AAPT hacking case study. In a case study published by Palfrey (2013) 
discusses the attack, and the implication under previous and new laws, which targeted the 
Australian Internet Service Provider AAPT resulting in customer data was being hacked and 
published on the internet. 
The data exposed by the anonymous hackers was held on a server managed by 
WebCentral Pty, Ltd, a web-hosting business unit of Melbourne IT. Under the contract between 
AAPT and WebCentral, WebCentral was required to adequately manage and maintain the server, 
except for the custom application content and data, which was the responsibility of AAPT. The 
hackers accessed the data through this customer application named “Cold Fusion” while AAPT 
was using an old version of Cold Fusion, which was known to have vulnerabilities. When 
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Melbourne IT became aware of the attack it notified AAPT, which immediately disconnected 
from the network and took steps to ensure the data could not be further compromised. 
As put forward by Palfrey (2013)  Australian Privacy Commissioner, Timothy Pilgrim, 
found AAPT had breached the Privacy Act in respect of the incident. More elaboratively Under 
Australian National Privacy Policy (NPP 4.1), an organization is required to take reasonable 
steps to protect the personal information it held from misuse and loss and unauthorized access or 
disclosure. The question in this scenario was whether AAPT or WebCentral held the data. The 
Commissioner took the view that AAPT held the data despite it being stored on WebCentral's 
server. Accordingly, AAPT had the obligation under NPP4.1. The finding of this case study will 
be discussed further in Chapter 4. 
Case study in a developing country. Adelola, Dawson, and Batmaz (2015), surveyed in 
Nigeria to discover the locals' views on information security and privacy. The study concentrated 
on all aspects of privacy, but from the outset, the authors warranted that the majority gave 
privacy a financial connotation. The dependent variables included the instruments the individuals 
used that put their data at risk including e-banking, e-commerce and traditional banks' websites 
(Adelola et al., 2015). 
The survey consisted of 51% male and 49% female respondents, a total of 72. They were 
of banking ages of between 20 and 50 years, with the majority (41%) being 20 to 29 years of 
age. The highest education qualification of the participants was the Bachelor's level at 42% while 
the lowest was a certificate, at 1 percent (Adelola et al., 2015). 
The main questions of the survey (see Appendix B) included the following abridged ones: 
1. Do you ever get concerned about the data you offer online? 
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2. Have spam messages from non-affiliates to your bank ever keep you on the alert on 
your data? 
3. Are you knowledgeable of identity theft and its consequences? 
4. Is the state reliable as a custodian of privacy of individual information? 
All the questions concerned mostly financial institutions that most of the surveyed group 
dealt with online and the authors considered them equally important to the respondents (Adelola 
et al., 2015). The chart below indicates the main classifications of privacy that the above four 
questions highlighted: 
 
Figure 8: Main areas of privacy concerns among Nigerians, Adeola et al. (2015) survey.  
Case Studies on Microfinance 
 
Survey from Asia. Shuhidan et al. (2017) carried out a study in Malaysia on mobile 
banking security. The sample microfinance customers who used mobile banking received 
electronic questions on many aspects including privacy. The questions on privacy read, in 
5 5 5 5
UNKNOWN DATA 
MISUSE
NON-AFFILLIATE 
BREACH
IDENTITY THEFT STATE 
TRUSTIWORTHINESS
Privacy classification areas deemed important in the survey
Le
ve
l o
f 
im
p
o
rt
an
ce
Privacy classification
49 
 
 
 
abridged form: 1] How do you feel about your private information being used by mobile banks? 
2] Are you of the view that your mobile banking data is at risk of hacking? 
The study groups consisted of demographically exposed users of micro-finance 
technology such as m-banking, in the age bracket of 20-39 (Shuhidan et al., 2017). They 
numbered 384. Two hundred and six of these were male while a 178 were female. Among the 
dependencies of the survey was the educational attainment of which 72.7% had a degree and 
27.3 a postgraduate degree. None had a personal business but the majority, at 82.3%, worked in 
private capacities. All used smart devices for communication and financial needs (Shuhidan et al. 
(2017). 
Among the preliminary concerns which the study identified that contributed to the main 
issue of privacy was the fact that they feared the loss of their data via faulty transactions that 
would hurt their social relations (Shuhidan et al., 2017). It is interesting that the survey also 
asked the respondents of other factors outside privacy that affected them. The performance was 
the main question, and it attracted a response rate higher than that of privacy (Shuhidan et al., 
2017). (For results see discussion section). Appendix C presents the questions of the survey. 
Survey from Africa. To underscore the ease of breach of privacy in microfinance sectors 
in developing countries, the following details present a survey of the number of microfinance 
and informal banking customers in several African countries. A study by Maimbo, Faye, and 
Triki (2011), found that there is no easy categorization of microfinance from informal savings 
outlets.  Thus, there is a high likelihood of some uncategorized institutions to escape privacy 
laws (Maimbo et al., 2011). 
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For instance, the survey found that in countries like Kenya, 33% of the respondents did 
not have any financial affiliation, while 26% were in microfinance (Maimbo et al., 2011). In 
Malawi, on the other hand, the majority of the surveyed were informal financial institutions, at 
55%, while 19% of the participants were in microfinance. In Namibia, 2% were in microfinance 
while 52% were unbanked. Uganda had 42% of microfinance respondents while 33% had no 
financial affiliation. The respondents from Zambia were 14% from microfinance while 65% were 
unbanked (Maimbo et al., 2011). 
 
Figure 9: Microfinance vs. informal banking as per survey respondents by Maimbo et al. (2011). 
A case study in rural Ghana by Gyabi and Shrivas (2016), sought to partake of rural 
financial institutions due to their small-scale operations against their information security and 
privacy measures.  A sample area of Ashanti in interior Ghana served as the background for the 
study. The scope of the research was thirty thousand total customers. However, the research 
focused on particular service providers and mixed the workers', managers' and customers' input 
in the questionnaire-based survey (Gyabi & Shrivas, 2016). 
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The main questions of the survey in abridged format included the following: 
1. Which data privacy policy does your company have? 
2. Which was the last date when your bank updated the data breach action guideline? 
3. Does your financial outlet undertake mock information recovery tests to prepare for 
breaches?  Appendix D has the full questionnaire format, while the findings are in the 
next section. 
Case Study on the Variable of Information Security in Microfinance 
According to a report by Baur-Yazbeck, Jenik, and Valenzuela (2017), the lax regulatory 
framework on micro-finance and particularly mobile banking has affected negatively on East 
African and West African countries. The study highlighted the effect of the following 
information security variables: (1) the impact of data identity theft via mobile banking, (2), the 
level of 'social engineering' (Baur-Yazbeck et al., 2017) during transactions, and (3) virus are 
planting on clients' mobile devices. 
The study then used the data to estimate the total effect, in monetary terms, of the lax 
information security regulations. The preliminary estimate for the entire of Africa's mobile 
banking was two billion dollars’ worth of lost finance (Baur-Yazbck et al., 2017). That of Ghana 
was fifty million dollars (Baur-Yazbeck et al., 2017). The full results of the report are in the 
findings section and Appendices E & F. 
Case Study on the Variable of Privacy in Microfinance 
Privacy in Myanmar came under the test in 2004 when the state passed a law that 
required the enforcement of a data protection clause for online certificate revelation to unmask 
criminals. The open certificate would be inclusive of the user's identity details and secret codes 
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during an online sign in, under the 'Electronic Transaction Law” (Myanmar Center for 
Responsible Business, 2015). Before that date, the closest law on privacy was the general 
mention of the term in the country's constitution (Myanmar Center for Responsible Business, 
2015). MCRB surveyed seventy-three corporate sites, most of which were in microfinance. The 
researcher formulated evaluation criteria that constituted the following set of model questions or 
their equivalents: 
1.  Did the companies have in place an explicit privacy statement or data on how they 
would handle their clients' and stakeholders' information? 
2.  How many of the 73 entities had their privacy statements embedded as part and parcel 
of their corporate ethics and mission statements?  
3.  How many of the 73 companies had put into place sufficient data protection 
information that a visitor to the website could easily consult? 
4.  How many entities of the seventy-three had not implemented any privacy regulations 
on their sites? (Myanmar Center for Responsible Business, 2015).  
Appendix G has the above information in the tabled form. 
Failed Privacy Laws in Financial and Microfinance Sectors 
 
Failed privacy policy case in a developed country. In developed countries like South 
Korea, privacy laws have ever failed to protect 85% of all web users in the country that log in 
daily and input private data (Mendel, Puddephatt, Wagner, Hawtin, & Torres, 2012).  In June 
2011, around thirty-five million subscribers of a communication company via which they used 
their financial and other personal data lost their data after a hacking incident (Mendel et al., 
2012). The hacking took place in two major customer channels, namely the social media 
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extension of the company and its search architecture. The reasons for the compromised data 
might have been the requirement by the state on the use of SSN by customers before they could 
log in (Mendel et al., 2012). In other words, the breach was occasioned by the very privacy laws 
that sought to protect the bank and the personal data of consumers.  Overall, 70% of native 
Koreans and 90% of all residents of the country suffered from the hacking breach (Mendel et al., 
2012). The chart below presents the salient details. 
 
Figure 10:  Number of users affected by the breach and total internet users in 2011 in South 
Korea. 
 
A failed case study in microfinance in developing countries. As a part of a report on 
global trends on microfinance privacy breaches in the form of cyber-attacks, Mommens (2016), 
presented the case of Senegal in three years. Between 2014 and 2016, the Sahel nation saw its 
biggest micro-finance institutions suffer breaches alongside their governmental and bank 
counterparts. The study presented the effects of the compromises in three contexts that included 
(1) consumer data vulnerability due to weak regulation and (2) direct loss of money saved in 
affected accounts. The third one was poor trust as a result of the delayed acquisition by 
TOTAL INTENET USERS 
IN KOREA
USER NUMBER DATA 
BREACHED
0
5000000
10000000
15000000
20000000
25000000
30000000
35000000
40000000
45000000
Number of user data breaches versus total Internet users
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 o
f 
In
te
rn
e
t 
u
se
rs
Privacy data breach Total Internet users
54 
 
 
 
microfinance institutions of the technology to prepare their customers for breaches. The outcome 
of the above case study was to the effect that data laws in Senegal, with the latest one being of 
the year 2008 (Boshe, 2016), have been ineffective as the attacks took place only half a dozen 
years later. The table below presents the three variables above and their effect on Senegal's 2014 
to 2016 micro-finance breaches. 
Table 4 
 
Reasons Behind Data Breaches in Senegal 
 
Reason for privacy and data breach in 
Senegal's microfinance 
Outcome 
Weak regulation of privacy and data 
protection laws 
Loss of sensitive client information (Mommens, 
2016). 
Direct loss of money in accounts It accounted for 80 percent of all information 
security breaches of microfinance in the study 
period (Mommens, 2016). 
Low trust by banks on technology Due to the heightened rate of cyber-attacks, 
micro-finance institutions have been left behind 
from developing in tandem with technology 
(Mommens, 2016). 
 
From the above sample studies, there is a reflection of accountability despite ongoing 
data compromises in developed nations. It is apparent that the heart of contention for most 
developed countries is whether to adopt stronger laws, like the European ones than they currently 
have or not (Movius & Krup, 2009). For instance, in the Morgan Stanley breach of 2014, the 
Federal Trade Commission (2015), concluded that the bank had implemented both its rules and 
GBLA rules of the United States. The Security and Exchange Commission (2016), questioned on 
the enforcement of written data privacy laws in the bank. 
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The case study problems in this section have also shown that most developing nations in 
Africa and Asia still have outdated privacy clauses and are playing catch with cybersecurity. It is 
apparent that countries like Senegal still have breaches in micro-finance security in the current 
decade despite passing the 'Data Protection Act' (Boshe, 2016; Mommens, 2016). There is also a 
widespread lack of concern about the sprouting informal banking institutions such as mobile 
banking all over Africa. The latter institutions lack privacy laws like those that govern micro-
finance (Maimbo et al., 2011). From the evidence of customers' distrust of online banking and 
the lack of awareness about the undue exposure of their private data, developing countries are 
still recording poor data regulations (Bauer-Yazbeck et al., 2017). For instance, Nigeria has 
suffered a massive five hundred and fifty million dollars' worth of losses in micro-finance and 
micro-banking alone from cyber incidents (Baur-Yazbeck et al., 2017). 
In light of the above foreclosing assessment, the following section will present the full 
results of the above surveys and will offer discussions around the salient points such as privacy 
laws. 
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Chapter 4: Findings and Discussion 
The following are the findings in consecutive order of the case studies presented in the 
Methodology section. Each survey follows a discussion about the current privacy and 
information security laws. The latter clauses will aid to interpret the results. 
Findings on FTC (2015) and SEC (2016) 
The case in question refers to the breach of consumer data through an internal worker of 
Morgan Stanley in the United States from 2012 to 2014. The Federal body for privacy and cyber 
regulations in the United States found that Morgan Stanley had implemented the necessary 
controls for the preservation of the clients' privacy (Federal Trade Commission, 2015). The other 
point was that the accessibility of information was only for business reasons, and the use of 
external dongles by the workers was prohibited. The third point of the findings was that the 
company had put in place stringent surveillance to assess the rate at which the staff disbursed 
client information and the volume of such an exchange (Federal Trade Commission, 2015). 
The immediate results were to the effect that the bank's worker breached a tiny repository 
that was the only one that the company had not well maintained (Federal Trade Commission, 
2015). This indicated a minor information security breach that FTC found severe but which it 
allowed passing as the banker immediately overhauled the repository after the breach. It was also 
notable that the compromised private information was in a system that had not received a 
security update like the rest and highlighted that privacy and information security is a perpetual 
process (Federal Trade Commission, 2015). Appendix A has the tabled results of FTC's closure 
of the case. 
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A year later, another body in the United States for protecting consumer rights offered a 
one-million dollar fine on Morgan Stanley (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2016). 
The bank would also dismiss the worker responsible for the breach. The findings of the securities 
body were different from that of FTC in these respects: guilt, documentation, and seriousness of 
the privacy breach. The table below explores the securities body's latter-day findings: 
Table 5 
 
The SEC Findings which Indicated that the US Bank had Inadequate Privacy Policies 
 
Privacy and data breach Count SEC Ruling 
No policy in written form. The company had no written regulations and 
needed to come up with them (U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 2016). 
The severity of the breach. The breach was severe as it took place in a 
continuous period of three years, ending 2014 
and affected nearly three-quarters of a million 
accounts (U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2016). 
The guilt of poor authorization system on 
data restrictions. 
The company had maintained the same 
authorization programming on its network for a 
decade, which made it possible for retrieval of 
data for reasons other than business purposes  
(U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
2016) 
 
Discussion. Two prominent points have come up in the above two findings: (1) what 
constitutes a severe data breach in a developed country and (2) the internal data protection 
mechanisms that measure the degree of privacy implementation by a financial institution. 
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On the first point, the US Act of 2007 on identity theft applies because the large breached 
accounts could easily pass into the hands of Internet impersonators (Johnson et al., 2014), this 
affects information security as it applies to a cyber-threat. It also affects privacy in equal measure 
as it leads to the possible sale of customer data (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
2016). Indeed, the seriousness of the case was that some of the consumer details after the breach 
were on offer online (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2016). 
On the second point, it is apparent that unlike many similar cases in the developing 
countries, the US bank had some vibrant internal security mechanisms according to the earlier 
ruling by the Federal Trade Commission (2015). However, as the securities body argued, the 
bank may not have put enough internal control to restrict access to sensitive data (Securities 
Exchange Commission, 2016). Therefore, there was what one may call an effort on the part of 
the US bank but which did not fully satisfy the privacy law. 
Findings on Tesco Bank Breach–UK 
In 2016 United Kingdom saw 20,000 of Tesco Bank's customers have their money stolen 
during a sophisticated cyber-attack which was probably the most significant data breach that the 
UK's banking sector has faced at that time. 
As Vovk (2016) points out that despite some links to fraudsters abroad, there is a 
possibility that there was probably a mole inside Tesco Bank helping the thieves. The exercise 
conducted on the bank's system shows that it is tough to penetrate and remotely access a bank's 
network without assistance from inside, whether it was done deliberately or happened by 
mistake.  
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UK's Finance, insurance, and credit institutions were regulated by the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) in terms of data protection guided by the Data Protection Act 1998, however 
with the introduction of The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), those institutions 
have to comply with rules and regulations by both FCA and GDPR. 
 As Davis (2018) states, fundamentally the GDPR requires that an organization must now 
directly inform individuals of what it does with their data–where and how it collects the data, 
how it is processed, and to whom it is given. The organization has duties to make this 
communication when it first collects data about individuals and when it changes how it will use 
that data in the future.  
The GDPR, as with the earlier data protection legislation, deals only with data about 
living individuals, not business data. Data from which individuals cannot be identified, for 
example, anonymized data, is not subject to the restrictions of the legislation. The legislation 
primarily applies to a data controller–the organization that "determines the purposes and means 
of processing personal data." Some obligations are also placed on a data processor–an 
organization that "processes personal data on behalf of the controller" (Davis, 2018). 
Discussion. Showing the active nature of UK's privacy regulations on financial 
institutions the case of Tesco Breach is considered by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) as 
a possible breach of Principle 3 of its Principles for Businesses. As Charlesworth and Stanton 
(2016) point out under this principle, an organization must take reasonable care to organize and 
control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems. This 
raised questions as to whether adequate protection against the risk posed by evolving forms of 
cybercrime was in place at Tesco Bank.  Although the wording is not yet finalized on this case if 
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a failure in this area is established there is the possibility that the bank will face a substantial 
financial penalty. 
Furthermore, Tesco Bank's regulatory problems may not be limited to compliance with 
FCA, as the Information Commissioner (ICO) in the UK is also taking an interest. While the ICO 
currently only has the power to issue monetary penalties of up to £500,000,  
When the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) comes into force in 2018, banks 
will have more reason to worry about the ICO. Penalties for serious data breaches under 
that legislation could be up to 20,000,000 EUR or for an undertaking, up to 4% of the 
total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is higher. 
(Charlesworth & Stanton, 2016)  
Apart from the aforementioned facts which gives evidence that UK has quite strong data 
protection regulations in place which only got stronger with the implementation of GDPR in 
May 2018, the law on unauthorized payments, Regulation 61 of the Payment Services 
Regulations 2009, requires a bank to refund the amount of an unauthorized payment transaction 
to the payer and to restore the debited payment account to the state it would have been in had the 
unauthorized payment transaction not taken place. Hence it is safe to say the UK is largely on top 
of things regarding having regulations in place and implementation in case of an incident like the 
Tesco Bank breach. 
Findings Australia: AAPT Hacking Case Study 
As Srinivas (2015) described in his article, in Australia there are few cybersecurity-
related legal, legislative and regulatory obligations applicable for all industry sectors including 
government agencies. Table 6 below lists those laws. 
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Table 6 
 
Australian Privacy-related Laws 
 
Australian Privacy Principles (APP) The APPs are intended to regulate the 
collection, holding, use and disclosure of 
personal information.  The APP applies to 
government and private institutions with more 
than AUD 3 million annual revenue. 
Cybercrime Act Offers comprehensive regulation of computer 
and Internet-related offenses such as unlawful 
access and computer trespass, damaging data 
and impeding access to a computer, theft of 
data, computer fraud, cyber-stalking, etc. 
Enhanced the applicability of search and 
Seizure provisions relating to electronic data. 
Spam Act Established a scheme for the regulation of 
commercial email and other electronic 
messages. 
Telecommunications Act Enacted with the objective of protecting the 
privacy of individuals who use the Australian 
telecommunication system. 
 
Although Australia lacks industry-specific data protection laws recently, they have 
brought forward the below regulation which took effect on January 1st, 2017. 
APRA Prudential Standards–CPS 220 (Risk Management) and CPS 231 (Outsourcing). 
These require APRA regulated entities to have proper risk management strategies, 
including IT systems, and to ensure that they properly manage outsourcing risk about 
material business activities, respectively. (Clarke, 2016) 
In this case of AAPT breach, the Australian Privacy Commissioner has given the verdict 
that AAPT had breached the privacy act as they held the data despite it being stored on a third 
party, WebCentral's, server. Mainly, AAPT had the obligation under Australian Privacy Policy 
11.1 which states in circumstances where an agency outsources the data storage; it will still be 
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likely to be regarded as holding the information under the new provisions and have obligations to 
protect the information. 
Discussion.  As evident from the AAPT case study, Australia has quite strong privacy 
policies although they lack industry-specific privacy laws. Australian Privacy Policies (APP) 
cover a wide range of privacy concerns and the authority figure of a Privacy Commissioner also 
gives more weight on privacy protection.   
 In this particular case study, the Australian Privacy Commissioner took the view that the 
Primary company AAPT is responsible for the breach even though a third-party company named 
WebCentral held the data breached. As discussed by Palfrey (2013) the Commissioner found 
AAPT failed to take reasonable steps to secure the personal information as required by the 
National Privacy Policies. Specifically, The Commissioner identified several deficiencies in the 
security of data provisions in the contract between AAPT and WebCentral including:  
• Data was not assessed to determine whether it included personal information and its 
sensitivity 
• Existing or emerging security risks were not required to be identified and addressed, 
• Vulnerability scanning and the effectiveness of the Cold Fusion application was not 
required to be undertaken (Palfrey, 2013). 
Moreover, in this occasion, the Privacy Commissioner had conducted an own motion 
investigation as a response to the media reports of this incident, which means that in Australia 
agencies are not relying on the fact that they have not received a complaint as an indication that 
any privacy breaches will not be pursued. 
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Findings on Adelola et al. (2015) 
The results of the survey by Adelola et al. (2015), concerning the views of Nigerians on 
data privacy online highlighted a typical scenario of developing countries, namely unconcern for 
the governmental laws and minimal awareness. 
The responses by the 72 participants on the question, “do you ever get concerned on the 
information you offer online?” were as follows:  20% said they did all the time, while the 
majority, at 44%, confirmed that they did so occasionally. Another 24% reported that they 
speculated about their information quite often (Adelola et al., 2015). The chart below highlights 
the full results.  
 
Figure 11:  Nigerians on data privacy online,  Adelola et al. (2015) survey results. 
On question 2, "have spam messages from non-affiliates to your bank ever keep you on 
the alert on your data?" the answers were as follows: 38% were concerned all the time, while 
37% were bothered on occasion, 20% feared quite often, and 6% not at all as the chart below 
illustrates: 
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Figure 12: Nigerians survey results about unsolicited non-affiliate spam messages, in Adelola et 
al. (2015) survey. 
 
About the third question on “are you knowledgeable of identity theft and its 
consequences?”, The results were as follows: 75% said they were aware while 21% were unsure 
and 4 percent knew nothing. The chart below depicts the data: 
 
Figure 13: Nigerians awareness of identity theft according to Adelola et al. (2015) survey. 
Regarding the final question to the effect, “is the state reliable as a custodian of privacy 
of individual information?”, the results were as follows: 17% had a strong 'no,' 36% were unsure, 
16% said 'yes,' while 31% simply said 'no.' The chart below has the details: 
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 Figure 14:  Survey results on trust in the state on privacy, Nigerians under the Adelola et al. 
(2015) survey. 
 
Discussion. From the results, it is apparent that the long-term lack of privacy laws in 
Nigeria has put finance institutions' customers to develop a distrust of the government on data. 
Indeed, apart from the large banks, many upcoming financial institutions in the country are under 
no privacy laws, while the majority do not enforce the existing ones (Egboro, 2015). 
The closest code of privacy was the 'NCC Act of 2007' (DLA Piper, 2017). It stipulates 
the safe upkeep of customer information in servers and the deletion of the same in due time 
(DLA Piper, 2017). However, its role does not holistically cover the entire industry for it evolved 
as an umbrella law for the telecoms (DLA Piper, 2017). For this reason, it is apparent that many 
locals are not bothered about the information they enter online, as they are not sure whether a 
privacy law covers them as the foregoing case study has revealed (Adelola, 2015). 
Findings on Beck et al. (2011) 
The case study by Beck et al. (2011), sought to convey the idea that there was a thin line 
between what constitutes privacy laws for micro-finance institutions and informal banking 
outlets. The survey found that in countries like Kenya, 33% of the respondents did not have any 
financial affiliation, while 26% were in microfinance (Beck et al., 2011). In Malawi, on the other 
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hand, the majority of the surveyed were informal financial institutions, at 55%, while 19% of the 
participants were in microfinance. In Namibia, 2% were in microfinance while 52% were 
unbanked. Uganda had 42% of microfinance respondents while 33% had no financial affiliation.  
The respondents from Zambia were 14% from microfinance while 65% were unbanked (Beck et 
al., 2011). Since informal banking outlets have little regulations, it was likely that some 
microfinance institutions might also fall under the same categorization (Beck et al., 2011). 
 
Figure 15: Informal banking vs. microfinance, survey results by Beck et al. (2011). 
 
Discussion. The aspects of privacy and data protection in most Sub-saharan Africa 
nations borrow partially from an interpretation of telecom, constitutional or other electronic 
privacy regulations (Jones, 2016). Therefore, with their larger population of users in comparison 
with their microfinance equivalents, informal banks bring the risk of no direct law to quote about 
privacy (Beck et al., 2011). In Kenya, for instance, mobile banking, as the most popular informal 
banking method has technological advances that the local privacy laws have not yet covered 
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(Malala, 2013). For these reasons, it is clear that the majority of informal banking avenues hurt 
the adoption of strong data protection regulations in microfinance establishments due to their 
similarities (Beck et al., 2011). 
Findings on Gyabi & Shrivas (2016) 
The case study by Gyabi and Shrivas (2016), sought to assess the implementation rate of 
privacy and data security rules as well as the frequency of their enforcement in Ghanaian rural 
micro-banks.  The first question of “which data privacy policy does your company have?” 
received the following answers: 36% remarked on recorded policies. 20% remarked of written 
policies. 11% remarked on data encryption policies. 28% remarked on acceptance policies while 
5% highlighted social networking policies (Gyabi & Shrivas, 2016). An acceptance policy is a 
privacy statement mostly at the bottom of online sites of banks that the user ticks to the effect 
that he or she consents to a service with or without reading it (Lee, 2016). Under EU data laws, it 
is now possible to remove consent as easily as accepting it (Lee, 2016). A written policy is meant 
for reading in full, and the user can retrieve it in a portable format if it is in an electronic 
database (Lee, 2016). A recorded privacy policy is in audio format. Social networking policies 
are privacy settings that govern individual preferences including the sharing of data with people 
by age group (Aldhafferi, Watson, & Sajeev, 2013). Data encryption policies govern the securing 
of personal data by companies when sending it via electronic format such as via email.  
On the question on “which was the last date when your bank updated data breach action 
guideline?” the results were as follows: 19% reported no update. 46% reported updates in 12 
months. Four percent reported an extent of over 5 years without updates. 22% reported updates 
in 24 months. Nine percent reported updates every 5 years (Gyabi & Shrivas, 2016). 
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On the question: "does your financial outlet undertake mock information recovery tests to 
prepare for breaches?" the study recorded these outcomes: 5% did not know. 46% reported a 
'Yes.' 49% reported a 'No ' (Gyabi & Shrivas, 2016). The chart below presents the graphical 
results of this last question: 
 
Figure 16: Percentage of frequent data breach mock tests by rural micro-banks in Ghana, Gyabi, 
and Shrivas (2016). 
 
Discussion. From the data above, it is apparent that 'acceptance' data privacy policies and 
recorded policies at 28% and 36%, respectively, are higher than written policies, at 20%, data 
encryption policies, at 11% and social networking policies, at 5%  (Gyabi & Srhivas, 2016). It is 
also apparent that nearly half of the surveyed rural banks do not regularly update their security 
and data protection policies, manifest in the fact that they rarely test their systems for 
vulnerabilities (Gyabi & Shrivas, 2016). Micro-finance institutions in Ghana are under the 
'Banking Act of the year 2004' (Asante, 2017). Though it deals mainly with financial matters, the 
clause regulates on many issues, including data privacy. Indeed, many micro-finance institutions 
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did not pass the test when it first came in the mid-2000s (Asante, 2017). From the fact that the 
above survey took place four years after the enactment of the newest privacy law in Ghana of 
2012 (Dagbanja, 2016), it is apparent that the micro-finance institutions are still in the 
developing stages. 
Findings on Shuhidan et al. (2017) 
The findings on the Shuhidan et al. (2017), Malaysia case study on the security of the 
data of microfinance consumers who used mobile banking was to the effect that: 
1. “Are you of the view that your mobile banking data is at risk every time you sign in?” 
With a mean score of 3.2, with 5 being the highest score, customers expressed concern 
that their sensitive data would be accessible in their absence after they had first logged into their 
accounts (Shuhidan et al., 2017). 
2. “Are you of the view that your mobile banking data is at risk of hacking?” 
 With a mean score of 3.6, where 5 is the highest value, most customers expressed the 
misgivings that they did not use mobile-based microfinance because their data might be 
compromised by hackers (Shuhidan et al., 2017). 
The results in graphical form are as below: 
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Figure 17: Perception of privacy risk at sign-in vs. privacy risk of hacking. 
Discussion. The microfinance sub-sector in Malaysia dates back to the late 1980s to 
facilitate loan accessibility to the era's unbanked population (Mokhtar, Nartea & Gan, 2012). Up 
to 2010, Malaysia utilized a 20th-century data law that did not reflect emerging technologies. 
After the national assembly passed the bill on individual data privacy in 2010, it was a turning 
point. Before then, even the constitution did not have a direct mention of 'banking privacy,' and 
so courts used precedents to resolve data breach cases, especially in mobile banking (Cieh, 
2013). This legal background may highlight the above case studies results in that many locals are 
yet to approach the laws seriously fully and they take to privacy in microfinance warily (Cieh, 
2013). 
Findings on the Variable of Information Security Laws in East Africa/  
West Africa Report (2017) 
This is about the report by Baur-Yazbeck et al. (2017) that cybercrime in East and West 
Africa pertains mostly to financial losses via mobile banking data vulnerabilities. As 
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aforementioned in the methodology section, the variables of cybercrime in these Sub-Saharan 
Africa regions included identity theft, virus planting and 'social engineering' (Baur-Yazbeck et 
al., 2017). The results of the report on lax mobile banking in East Africa presented consolidated 
results across the above three strands of information security (Baur-Yazbeck et al., 2017). In the 
East African region, Kenya had the highest negative outcomes: poor information security in 
mobile finance cost the country a hundred and seventy-five million US dollars in 2016 (Baur-
Yazbeck et al., 2017). Tanzania followed with eighty-five million US dollars while data breaches 
in Uganda's micro-banking amounted to thirty-five million US dollars. In West Africa, poor 
information security regulation cost the micro-banking sector of Nigeria five hundred and fifty 
US dollars. Appendix F has information on the percentage of cyber crime related to mobile 
banking using the above Sub-saharan countries' data. 
Discussion. To alleviate data breaches associated with its rise as the regional pioneer of 
mobile banking, Kenya enacted an act in 2010 that embraced the communications sector (Baur-
Yazbeck et al., 2017). Uganda, on the other hand, has enacted information security laws that 
borrow from similar cyber decrees in the economic bloc of East African nations (Baur-Yazbeck 
et al., 2017). Therefore, from the above financial losses, it is apparent that the laws are not well 
implemented. 
Findings on the Variable of Privacy Laws in Myanmar Survey (2015) 
The following are the findings of the case above study in Myanmar in 2015. The case 
focused on the number of companies, seventy-three in all, which implemented various aspects of 
privacy policies. 
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  Findings. On the issue of the explicit statement of privacy statements, just 6 of the 23 
entities had clear guidelines on clients', employees' and affiliates' information (Myanmar Center 
for Responsible Business, 2015). Only three had their privacy statements embedded onto their 
main corporate policies, such as mission and ethics. Regarding exceptions to data privacy, one 
Information Service Provider had no disclosure on privacy anywhere on its site (Myanmar 
Center for Responsible Business, 2015). Overall, the bulk of the surveyed entities especially in 
micro-finance did not parade information on the way they would handle their clients' privacy as 
the law required of them. The chart below depicts the findings. 
Figure 18: Availability of privacy policy information on website (Myanmar Center for 
Responsible Business, 2015). 
 
Discussion. In Myanmar, it is illegal by law to misuse the private information of clients 
of micro-finance establishments (Choudhary, 2017). This is under the first item of the 
Notifications decree of 2016 (Choudhary, 2017). The clause not only bars the institutions not to 
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avail sensitive details that are personal to clients but that a search about a customer's state of debt 
should not dig too deep into the individual's privacy (Choudhary, 2017). For this reason, it is 
apparent that most micro-banks in Myanmar are not able to even assess the amount of debt a 
client can afford because of the restrictions (Choudhary, 2017). For this reason, they often rely 
on other banks that the customer may be privy to for verification purposes (Choudhary, 2017). It 
is notable that the Notifications Act of 2016 came after the above survey took place and thus had 
no effect on the outcomes. 
Findings on Sun and Lee (2013) 
This section concerns the ineffectiveness of data privacy management system by banks in 
South Korea to keep up with the country's 'Personal Information Protection Law of 2012' (Sun & 
Lee, 2013). The study suggests that despite the increment in online banking, there is a dearth of 
an understanding of the most effective privacy management system or database in banking 
institutions (Sun & Lee, 2013). The authors assert that such a system has been challenging to 
maintain due to the fast pace of financial software in a technology-savvy country like South 
Korea (Sun & Lee, 2013). Some of the challenges include the lack of enough resources in private 
financial outlets to regularly calibrate such a system (Sun & Lee, 2013). 
Discussion. It is clear that in Korea, privacy issues in banking emanate from 
technological advances and powerful privacy laws which banks find it hard to maintain (Yoo, 
Kang, & Kim, 2015). The 2012 law was a follow-up to the 2006 EFTA law that sought to 
safeguard information security in finance (Sohn, 2016; Sun & Lee, 2013). In 2017, the sharp rise 
of financial software in banking saw the country's watchdog on data security highlight that the 
more users get access to programs, the greater their financial data becomes less private (Yonhap, 
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2017). Other sources claim that users may even have low motivation in the utility of online 
banking if technology presents more privacy exposure than it covers (Kim & Chi, 2015). 
Data privacy in Korea had existed since 1999 when the 'E-Documents Act' (Sohn, 2016) 
came to be. In the course of the past 20 years. This act has grown together with the 'EFTA' 
framework that guides information security in finance (Sohn, 2016). Therefore, despite strong 
privacy in a developing country, there are still technical vulnerabilities. Appendix I and J have 
the details of the progress of the data privacy laws timeline in Korea. 
Findings on Mommens (2016) 
The case in question is a publication in 2016 that stipulated that between 2014 and 2015, 
Senegal's largest microfinance outlets suffered breaches together with their governmental 
equivalents from cybercrime. The outcome of the above case study was to the effect that data 
laws in Senegal, with the latest one being of the year 2008 (Boshe, 2016), have been ineffective 
as the attacks took place only half a dozen years later. The table below presents the three 
variables above and their effect on Senegal's 2014 to 2016 micro-finance breaches. 
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Table 7 
 
Reasons for Data Breaches in Senegal 
 
Reason for privacy and data breach in 
Senegal's microfinance 
Outcome 
Weak regulation of privacy and data 
protection laws 
Loss of sensitive client information (Mommens, 
2016). 
Direct loss of money in accounts It accounted for 80 percent of all information 
security breaches of microfinance in the study 
period (Mommens, 2016). 
Low trust by banks on technology Due to the heightened rate of cyber-attacks, 
micro-finance institutions have been left behind 
from developing in tandem with technology 
(Mommens, 2016). 
 
Discussion. In Senegal, information security and privacy regulation are composite of 
'Law Number 2008 to 2012' (Privacy International, 2013). The clause covers a range of data 
borderlines including that between users of mobile devices and banking data. The closest it 
comes to microfinance is the stipulation for financial and mobile service providers to uphold 
individuals' data and not transmit it to affiliates without the owner's consent (Privacy 
International, 2013). Applying these laws to the outcomes of 2014 to 2016, it is apparent that 
there were loopholes for the country as the breaches happened even in the existence of the 
cybercrime  'Law Number 2008-2011' (Privacy International, 2013). As a proof of their 
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ineffectiveness, the 2014-2016 attacks took place just a few years after the laws (Mommens, 
2016; Boshe, 2016). 
The Conclusion to Findings and Discussion 
Of the ten case studies, apart from Malaysia and Nigeria all other developing countries 
show a low presence of privacy regulations, while all four developing countries studied shows 
high to medium presence of privacy regulations. Whereas, level of enforcement of privacy 
regulations and level of effectiveness of privacy regulations, the other two factors discussed all 
has a clear differential between developed and developing countries with only Malaysia as a 
developing country has a medium level of enforcement and effectiveness in privacy regulations 
(see Appendix H). 
The Federal Trade Commission (2015), and the Securities Exchange Commission (2016), 
case studies present mixed outcomes for the 2012-2014 Morgan Stanley data breach in the US. 
Adeola et al. (2015), show the failure of the application of privacy laws in Nigeria's micro-
finance sector. The same applies to Shuhidan et al. (2017), in their survey on Malaysia where 
customers distrust signing in for fear of data misuse. Gyabi and Shrivas (2016), also reveal a 
failure in the privacy protection mandate in Ghana's rural banking. In Burma, the Myanmar 
Center for Responsible Business (2015), reports that just three out of seventy-three entities have 
clear on-site guidelines on the privacy of the users and affiliates. Mendel et al. (2012), also show 
that breaches still happen in a developed country, namely South Korea. The study has also 
documented failure in Senegal from a cybercrime spree of 2012 to 2014 (Mommens, 2016). 
Regarding the variable of the presence of privacy regulations, it is apparent that most 
countries within developing countries have no sufficient data protection measures. For instance, 
77 
 
 
 
Kenya and Nigeria have both lost millions of dollars through mobile banking crimes (Baur-
Yazbeck et al., 2017). Regarding the variable of the presence of privacy regulations, it is clear 
that developing countries have outdated policies that do not reflect modern technology and thus 
most consumers are not aware of the laws. In developed nations, privacy laws are quite clear, for 
instance in the European Union, but still, breaches happen such as the Snowden leaks (Kuner, 
2014). 
Table 8 
 
Variables of the Research (Results in Appendix H). 
 
Variables Evaluation  
Presence of privacy regulations Low/Medium/High 
Level of Enforcement of privacy regulations Low/Medium/High 
The effectiveness of privacy regulations Low/Medium/High 
 
Presence of privacy regulations and enforcement of privacy regulation both affect the 
effectiveness of those privacy regulations. The findings reveal that the level of effectiveness of 
the privacy and data protection legislation in developing countries is ineffective to keep up with 
modern technologies. Those of the developed countries, on the other hand, are strong but require 
regular updates. 
From the above evaluation, the consensus is to the effect that data security is still in a 
developing stage in the Third World while its level of embracement in the developed countries 
revolves around the maximum level of implementation. For instance, the findings in the South 
Korea data breach of 2011 reveal that in the case where 90 percent of the web users were 
affected by a data breach, the reason was extra-strong SSN enforcement (Mendel et al., 2012). 
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Therefore, extra precautionary measures may misfire when the hackers' technology gets access to 
the most sensitive SSN information of the users (Mendel et al., 2012). This is despite the laws in 
Korea being up-to-date. 
In Malaysia's ongoing modernization of privacy laws, the ramifications of waiting too 
long between the 1990s and the current decade have seen many consumers fear that signing in 
leaves their data open to misuse (Shuhidan et al., 2017). Indeed, it is one of the states in the 
developing world with the recent impressive growth of privacy laws. The latest legislation 
reflects a country eager to align its privacy protocols with those of the European Union and the 
regional south-east Asia economic bloc (Yu, 2014).  
In Africa, the findings reveal the lack of awareness by the customers due to the deficiency 
of information on their online privacy, especially about online eCommerce and micro-finance 
(Adelola et al., 2015). For instance, the results from Nigeria have shown that just 20% of 
financial services' users in a survey are concerned about what they input online while 44% are 
concerned only on occasion (Adelola et al., 2015). This is even though the West African nation 
perpetually reigns in on banks and micro-finance institutions with new laws, the latest one being 
in 2010 (Makulilo, 2012).  
In short, there is a disparity between the developed privacy laws of Western countries that 
make financial firms accountable for privacy compromises (Securities & Exchange Commission, 
2016) and those of developing nations. The laws of the latter either exist only generally in the 
constitution, are in draft format or are behind technology (Makulilo, 2012; Privacy International, 
2016). 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
In summation, three glaring elements define privacy and data regulations worldwide. The 
first one is the imitation of the general data protection regulations of the European Union in 
developed nations. The second is the slow drafting of new laws in developing countries. The 
third one is the exposure of consumer privacy to hackers and social engineering breaches, 
especially in micro-finance institutions (Baur-Yazbeck et al., 2017). 
About the first point, the European Union's new framework that governs online data 
breaches is set to overrule those of member states in mid-2017. Cross-border data leaks have 
made many countries see the need for EU-like regulations that are 'international' (Kuner, 2014). 
The legal conundrum surrounding whether to adopt similar regulations is that they are quite 
strong for nations outside the EU as even local businesses are yet to prepare for them (Gordon, 
2017). Nevertheless, the lack of improvisation of similar policies may hurt trade relations where 
data breaches may lead to misunderstandings. The United States, for this reason, is still 
deliberating whether to forge stringent rules like those on the other side of the Atlantic (Movius 
& Krup, 2009). 
In respect to the second point of slow privacy and data law development in developing 
countries, the study has shown that there are exceptions but these are few. For instance, Malaysia 
is under a renaissance of its 1990s laws with an ongoing stance towards EU-affiliated policies 
(Yu, 2014). In South America, despite the common use of electronic payment systems, Brazil 
was still indecisive on the promulgation of cyber laws to govern the cards by 2014 (Johnson et 
al., 2014). Most Asian nations are still relying on their cyber protection laws of the 1990s that do 
not bear on the changing technology (Greenleaf, 2014). The majority of Sub-Saharan African 
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states still have underdeveloped micro-finance data laws: for instance in Uganda; the laws are yet 
to exist although the majority of the population relies on the micro institutions for their banking 
needs (Mwesigwa, 2010). 
On the point of data exposure by both financial and micro-finance institutions, the study 
has shown that the effect is prevalent in the developing countries. Worthy mentions include 
Kenya, Nigeria, and Ghana, which are some of the countries in Africa with the highest rates of 
micro-finance cybercrime (Baur-Yazbeck et al., 2017). In Kenya, for instance, lax mobile 
banking information security cost the country $175 million in 2016 (Baur-Yazbeck et al., 2017). 
However, when a breach happens in a developed nation, it is usually of high impact. For 
instance, the South Korea hacking of 2011 left thirty-five million dependents of the country's 
Internet affected. In the United States, on the other hand, a worker at Morgan Stanley left over 
seven hundred and thirty thousand clients' files up for sale online despite the strong measures the 
firm put as a safeguard (Federal Trade Commission, 2015). 
In short, if the current privacy law in Europe comes to affect other states, it may lead to 
fewer cases of data breaches in states that implement it (Hert & Papakonstantinou, 2013). 
However, if developing nations stay put with outdated systems, technological breakthroughs by 
hackers will force the countries to improvise new laws (Hert & Papakonstantinou, 2013). In the 
current context, it is apparent that few financial companies in, especially, developing nations 
fully enforce privacy laws. 
Limitations 
During the evaluation of research material for this work, the study encountered the lack 
of sufficient information that directly applied to the subject of privacy information in the context 
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of micro-finance and finance. The majority of the research literature hinged upon privacy and 
data protection in a general context. Another limitation was an unclear separation between micro-
finance and informal banking, especially in the context of information security in developing 
countries. While some nations have data privacy laws specifically for microfinance, the 
legislation are often overshadowed by those for mobile banking which has the majority of users. 
A final and significant limitation was the fact that legislation in microfinance in most databases 
was of a credit regulation nature as opposed to data protection and privacy. Much of the gist of 
the legal framework aims to buffer consumers against financial exploitation by the micro-banks 
but not on privacy. To overcome these limitations, there was the necessity for thorough research 
of only case studies that were relevant to the study. 
Future Work 
In trying to answer one of the major discrepancies of this research, namely consumers' 
lack of awareness in privacy issues, especially in developing nations, future research can dwell 
on privacy and data protection education (Dennis, 2011). Certain third world countries like the 
Philippines are having such literacy drives (Dennis, 2011). This will alleviate the tendency by 
microfinance institutions in places like Lebanon and Nigeria to informally disburse client 
information to affiliates or openly discuss consumer data openly irrespective of privacy 
restrictions for such behavior in the respective countries (Abbassi, Khaled, & Lauer, 2009; 
Egboro, 2015). When consumers learn their privacy rights, they will not warrant their 
confidential to become a discussion point in boardrooms (Egboro, 2015). 
The coming of the General Data Protection Regulation in Europe in mid-May 2018 will 
also have an educational impact on countries outside the European Union that wish to follow it. 
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This is because they will need to educate their consumers about the rules when they adopt them 
just like European companies are preparing for the rules (Gordon, 2017). Thus, there is a need to 
research further on the aspect of consumer awareness of privacy laws through education. 
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Appendix A: FTC Ruling on Morgan Stanley Breach of Customer Privacy Through 
Exposure of Sensitive Data Online (FTC, 2015) 
 
Morgan Stanley Violation FTC Ruling 
Information security breach of customer's data. The bank had implemented the necessary steps 
to prevent a data breach, so the case was an 
isolated one. 
Exposure to consumer privacy. The bank was not liable for the individual 
worker breach as it had prohibited workers' 
entry into highly protected data repositories and 
so this was an isolated case. 
Lack of system security to reduce data breach. The bank had a well-maintained cyber-security 
network. The case applied only to a minor file 
repository which the company repaired 
immediately after the breach. 
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Appendix B: Survey on Privacy View of Users of Nigeria's Financial Institutions  
by Adelola et al. (2015) 
Question Response 
Do you ever get concerned about the 
data you offer online? 
44% said only occasionally. 
Have spam messages from non-affiliates 
to your bank ever keep you on the alert on your 
data? 
38% said they are on the alert all the time while 
37% said only on occasion. 
Are you knowledgeable of identity theft 
and its consequences? 
4% said they were unaware while 75 percent 
said they were aware. 
 
 
Is the state reliable as a custodian of privacy of 
individual information? 
36% were undecided, 31% said no while 16% 
said yes. 
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Appendix C: Privacy Questions to Malaysian Mobile Bankers on the Security  
of Their Data Online 
Questions relating to privacy Answer 
How do you feel about your private information 
being used by mobile banks? 
 
Are you of the view that your mobile banking 
data is at risk of hacking? 
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Appendix D: Gyabi & Shrivas (2016) Study on Ghana Micro-banking in  
Rural Ashanti Recorded the Following Questionnaire Data 
 
Question Results 
Which kind of data privacy policy does your 
company have? 
36 percent remarked on recorded policies. 20% 
remarked of written policies. 11 percent 
remarked on data encryption policies. 28 
percent remarked on acceptance policies while 
5 percent highlighted social networking 
policies. 
1. Which was the last date when your 
bank updated data breach action 
guideline? 
19% reported no update. 46% reported updates 
in 12 months. 4% reported above five years 
without updates. 22% reported updates in 24 
months. 
Does your financial outlet undertake mock 
information recovery tests to prepare for 
breaches? 
5% did not know. 46% reported a 'Yes.' 49% 
reported a 'No.' 
If your financial outlet undertakes mock 
information recovery tests, how often does this 
happen? 
19% remarked no update ever. 46% remarked 
updates in 12 months. 4% remarked above five 
years updates. 22% remarked updates in 24 
months. 
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Appendix E: The Financial Dffect of Lax Regulations in Microfinance  
(Mobile Banking) in East Africa and West Africa 
Effect of poor laws 
on mobile banking 
in Africa 
Kenya in US$ Uganda in US$ Tanzania US$ Nigeria US$ 
Cybercrime (Virus, 
malware, identity 
theft, social 
engineering) 
175 million 35 million 85 million 550 million 
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Appendix F: Level of Cyber Crime Related to Lax Information Security in  
Mobile Banking in 2016 by Baur-Yazbeck et al. (2017) 
 
 
 
 
  
Kenya
21%
Nigeria
66%
Tanzania
9%
Uganda
4%
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Appendix G: Implementation of Privacy Regulations on Websites in Myanmar in 2014 
Privacy Survey model question Total: N=73 
Did the companies have in place an 
explicit privacy statement or data on how they 
would handle their clients' and stakeholders' 
information? 
6 
How many of the 73 entities had their 
privacy statements embedded as part and parcel 
of the corporate ethics and mission statement? 
3 
How many of the 73 companies had put 
into place sufficient information that a survey 
could access and interpret about data 
protection? 
Majority 
How many entities of the seventy-three 
had not implemented any privacy regulations on 
their sites? 
1 
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Appendix H: Empirical Results of the 10 Case Studies. The Summary of Success or Failure 
Empirical Results of Privacy and Information Security Laws Effectiveness 
From Different Countries in the 10 Case Studies 
Country/Case study Presence of 
Security/Privacy 
Regulations  
(Low/Medium/High) 
Level of Enforcement 
of Privacy 
Low/Medium/High) 
Effectiveness of 
privacy Reg. (as 
per the 
Researchers) 
United States High High Medium 
United Kingdom High High High 
Australia Medium High Medium 
South Korea Medium Medium Medium 
Nigeria Medium Low Low 
Kenya, Malawi, 
Namibia, Zambia 
Low Low Low 
Malaysia Medium Medium Medium 
Ghana Low Low Low 
Uganda, Tanzania Low Low Low 
Myanmar Low Low Low 
Senegal Low Low Low  
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Appendix I: The Progress of Four Korean Privacy Laws in the Early to mid-2000s 
 
  
E.Documents
Act
DSA ECCPA EFTA
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Ye
ar
Progress of four Korean privacy
acts in 2000s
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Appendix J: The Timeline of Privacy Laws Related to Finance in Korea Since 1999 
Korea Privacy Law Purpose 
E-Documents Act of 1999 Privacy and data security online (Sohn, 2016). 
DSA of 2002 For digital signature authorization online 
especially in finance (Sohn, 2016). 
ECCPA of 2002 Privacy of consumers online in e-Commerce, 
banking and other industries (Sohn, 2016). 
EFTA of 2006 For information security in finance (Sohn, 
2016). 
 
 
 
 
